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I. INTRODUCTION
In his 1995 inaugural address, Florida Governor Lawton Chiles
proclaimed a war on red tape, urging legislators to streamline gov-
ernment rules and take power away from bureaucrats.' In 1996, the
* The author thanks Professor Jim Rossi, Florida State University College of Law,
for his helpful comments and guidance throughout the development of this Comment.
1. See William Booth, Florida Seeks End to Rule By the Book; For Some Regulators,
Guidelines May Suffice, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1995, at Al. The Governor was influenced
by PHILLIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING
AMERICA (1994), which comments on contradictory decisions made by government bureau-
crats. See Booth, supra, at Al. However, even reviewers who praise Howard's book do not
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Florida Legislature responded by amending the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA).2 Originally adopted in 1974,1 the APA establishes
a framework that instructs state agencies how to promulgate and
administer rules. 4 Because the APA governs agency action ranging
from environmental regulation to insurance rulemaking to oversee-
ing professional conduct, its revision will have far reaching effects.
In reforming the APA, the Legislature used a powerful tool to
tweak the administrative system: attorney's fees. The 1996 revisions
authorize awards of attorney's fees in rule challenge proceedings and
reorganize existing attorney's fees provisions.5 Attorney's fees provi-
sions help redistribute resources from government to private parties,
subtly altering litigation patterns.6 In the past, however, the effects
of attorney's fees provisions have produced results different than ex-
pected.7 Thus, legislators should carefully craft attorney's fees pro-
visions through narrowly tailored statutes designed to achieve their
specific goals while minimizing companion costs.
The 1996 changes in Florida's attorney's fees provisions offer sev-
eral substantial benefits to the administrative process, such as
eliminating needless agency rules, simplifying the APA, monitoring
agencies, and redistributing resources between public and private
parties. 8 However, the Legislature failed to minimize the damaging
effects associated with the new changes, including overcrowded court
dockets, increased litigation expenses, overdeterrence of agency ac-
tions, and higher financial costs for agencies and the regulated pub-
lic.' The 1996 attorney's fees provisions can be modified to minimize
these effects while still accomplishing the goals of Governor Chiles
and the Legislature. Other states can learn from Florida's use of at-
torney's fees as they attempt to shape private litigation patterns and
agency action.
necessarily advocate his solution of a massive repeal of agency rules. See, e.g., Stephen T.
Maher, The Death of Rules: How Politics Is Suffocating Florida, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
313, 319 n.25 (1996) (citing George Gendron, The Death of Common Sense, INC., May
1995, at 11 (book review)). Other reviewers are more critical of Howard's book, strongly
disagreeing with his conclusion that government should rely upon general principles in-
stead of legal rules. See id. at 319 n.27 (citing Robert F. Nagel, The Death of Common Sense,
WASH. MONTHLY, Jan/Feb. 1995, at 45 (book review)). Critics assert that government cannot
run on abstract principles with regulators relying only on their judgment. See id.
2. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, 1996 Fla. Laws 147 (codified at FLA.
STAT. ch. 120 (Supp. 1996)).
3. See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 74-310, 1974 Fla. Laws 952.
4. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (Supp. 1996).
5. See ch. 96-159, § 25, 1996 Fla. Laws at 194.96 (codified at FLA. STAT § 120.595
(Supp. 1996)); see also discussion infra Part III.A.
6. See discussion infra Part V.A.4.
7. See Susan M. Olson, How Much Access to Justice from State "Equal Access to Jus-
tice Acts'?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 545, 577 (1996).
8. See discussion infra Part V.A.
9. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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This Comment examines changes in the 1996 attorney's fees pro-
visions from a cost/benefit perspective. Part II reviews recent legis-
lative efforts to reform the APA and the major forces behind the 1996
revisions. Part III summarizes the available ways to collect attor-
ney's fees in administrative proceedings after the 1996 changes. Part
IV briefly describes the emergence of fee-shifting statutes in the
United States and examines various types of fee-shifting mecha-
nisms. Part V presents a detailed cost/benefit analysis of the 1996
attorney's fees provisions. Finally, Part VI proposes several changes
to the new attorney's fees provisions. These changes are aimed at
minimizing costs while still accomplishing the Legislature's goals.
II. SETTING THE STAGE: REVIEW OF RECENT APA REFORM EFFORTS
Like all administrative procedure acts, the Florida APA aims to
prevent unlawful agency action and make agency decisionmaking
"fair and open."'1 However, Florida's system has been recently criti-
cized for its lack of control over agencies" and its overly complex
regulations.
A. Stirrings for APA Reform
In 1994, in response to this criticism, both the Florida House of
Representatives and the Florida Senate proposed bills containing
major APA revisions. 3 Although both bills died at the close of the
1994 Regular Session, 14 legislators candidly agreed that APA reform
was needed. The only dispute between the House and Senate was
over how much reform was necessary."
During his 1995 inaugural address, Governor Chiles announced
plans to end government overregulation through APA reform.'s After
his address, the Governor urged agency chiefs to seek out and repeal
red-tape rules. Answering the Governor's call with particular en-
thusiasm, Florida Secretary of Transportation Ben G. Watts com-
mented, "We compiled a list of rules and, lo and behold, out of 760
rules we found 330 to repeal."'7 Other agencies, such as the Depart-
10. F. Scott Boyd, A Traveler's Guide for the Road to Reform, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
247, 248 (1994).
11. See id. at 270.
12. See Michael Peltier, Long Agenda Awaits Legislators, Bus. J.-JACKSONVILLE,
Mar. 3, 1995, at 4-5.
13. See Fla. CS for HB 237 (1994); Fla. CS for SB 1440 (1994).
14. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1994 REGUL4R SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 230, HB 237.
15. See Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr., 1994 Proposals for Rulemaking Reform, 22 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 327, 344 (1994). Sellers notes that observers should "watch for similar [reform]
measures to be considered again in 1995." Id.
16. See Booth, supra note 1, at Al.
17. Id.
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ment of Environmental Protection (DEP), also answered the Gover-
nor's call to streamline regulation. Nevin Smith, DEP's executive
services director, commented that such a move would be positive be-
cause it would lead to "less mechanistic and legalistic" rules.'8 Thus,
a "bureaucracy-busting" attitude that affected legislators' attitudes
toward APA reform was prevalent before the 1995 Regular Session.' 9
Midway through the 1995 session, Governor Chiles called for a
complete repeal of the APA, stating that the administrative process
has become "too complicated for the average resident to participate [in]
without hiring a lawyer."20 However, complete abolition of the APA
was controversial because many legislators agreed that the APA pro-
vided citizens an avenue of relief from bureaucratic agency decisions.2'
In 1995, the Legislature passed a major APA reform bill.22 How-
ever, the Governor vetoed the bill, claiming it did not simplify the
administrative process enough.23 After the veto, Governor Chiles or-
dered executive agencies to continue cutting unnecessary rules and
established a commission to review the act and suggest reforms and
simplifications.
24
B. The Governor's Review Commission
The Governor established a fifteen-member Governor's Adminis-
trative Procedure Act Review Commission (Review Commission) to
18. Id. Smith used mangrove regulation to illustrate his point. See id. Mangroves are
marine trees that serve as nurseries for wildlife. See id. Because of the disappearance of
mangroves in Florida, DEP has provided regulations to prohibit trimming these trees. See
id. In response to these regulations, no one trims mangroves, but they do not plant them
either. Thus, Smith observes that this rule works against the ultimate goal of DEP: to
have more mangroves to nurture Florida's fish and other wildlife. See id. In a world with-
out rules, DEP would allow mangrove pruning while encouraging planting. See id.
19. See Peltier, supra note 12, at 1.
20. Lucy Morgan, Campaign to Rein in Rules Is on Its Way, ST. PETE. TIMES, Mar.
29, 1995, at 5B. Opponents of a total repeal claimed that government without an adminis-
trative procedure act would be chaos. See id. Tallahassee lawyer Tom Pelham, former
Secretary of the Florida Department of Community Affairs, commented that such a repeal
"would be the worst kind of phantom government." Id.
21. See Chiles Seeks to Repeal Act in Effort to Slice Red Tape, ORLANDO SENT., Mar.
31, 1995, at C5.
22. See Fla. CS for CS for SB 536 (1995).
23. Veto of Fla. CS for CS for SB 536 (1995) (letter from Gov. Chiles to Sec'y of State
Sandra B. Mortham, July 12, 1995) (on file with Sec'y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee,
Fla.); see also Chiles Vetoes Measure to Reduce Regulations, Citing Many Problems, FT.
LAUD. SUN SENT., July 13, 1996, at 12A. The Governor claimed that "he liked some as-
pects of the package but they were outweighed by a list of problems he perceived." Id. The
veto decision was not unexpected. In fact, Senate leaders delayed the bill's arrival on
Chiles' desk, hoping that time might change the Governor's mind. See id. Environmental-
ists applauded Governor Chiles' veto. David Gluckman, an environmental lobbyist, com-
mented that the 1995 measure was not a bill to "streamline administrative procedures, it
was a bill to shut down government." Craig Quintana, Chiles Scuttles Regulatory-Reform
Bill, ORLANDO SENT., July 13, 1995, at Cl.
24. See Quintana, supra note 23, at Cl.
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make suggestions for reforming and simplifying the APA.25 The Re-
view Commission played a major role in formulating the legislative
proposal that ultimately passed the Legislature and won the Gover-
nor's signature in 1996.
The Review Commission focused on three basic areas of reform:
(1) simplifying the APA; (2) increasing flexibility in the application of
administrative rules; and (3) increasing agency accountability to the
Legislature and the public.2" To give the administrative process
flexibility and to dispel perceptions of the system's rigidity, the Re-
view Commission recommended a new variance and waiver provi-
sion.17 The Review Commission also proposed rules to force agencies
to become more accountable to the Legislature and the general pub-
lic.28 For example, the Review Commission recommended that staff
analyses of bills highlight sections of proposed legislation that would
require agency rulemaking. 9 Agency input would be invited and in-
cluded in the staff analyses.
30
One of the major themes that the Review Commission sounded
was creating a "more level playing field" for persons who challenge
agency rules. 31 To facilitate this goal, the Review Commission pro-
posed abolishing the presumption of validity that attached to pro-
posed agency rules.3 2 The Review Commission thought a presump-
tion of validity should attach to a rule only after an agency proposal
met the APA's procedural requirements.
3
1
In addition, the Review Commission proposed changing the pro-
visions for attorney's fees.3 4 The Review Commission supported an
award of attorney's fees and costs whenever an agency rule is over-
turned.35 However, the Review Commission recommended allowing
the agency to avoid paying the prevailing party's attorney's fees if
the agency proves that its actions were "substantially justified. '36
25. See generally GOV.'S ADMIN. PROC. ACT REV. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT (1996)
[hereinafter REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT]. The Review Commission met six times be-
tween October 1995 and February 1996 to review the current administrative regulations
and make formal recommendations. See id. at v; see also Adam Yeomans, State Cutting
Rules; Chiles Seeks Even Less Red Tape, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., Jan. 29, 1996, at 5A.
26. See REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, at 1.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 2.
29. See id.
30. See id. Although agencies have sometimes provided informal comments or sug-
gestions regarding proposed legislation to committee staff members in the past, this pro-
posal would give agencies formal input into bill analyses.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 2-3.
34. See id. at 3.
35. See id.
36. Id. The standard of "substantially justified" would be as defined in the Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act. See FLA. STAT. § 57.111 (1995).
1997]
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The Review Commission decided that recovery of attorney's fees
should be limited to $15,000 per action."
C. The Reforming APA Legislation
At the beginning of the 1996 session, Senators Charles Williams"8
and Rick Dantzler 9 introduced Senate Bill 2290 to amend chapter
120, Florida Statutes.40 The bill was combined with Senate Bill 2288,
passed the Legislature, and was signed into law by Governor Chiles
on May 1, 1996.4" The legislation addresses various issues, including
legislative oversight, rulemaking authority, new procedural re-
quirements in rulemaking, and, of course, attorney's fees.
42
III. THE AVAILABLE AVENUES FOR OBTAINING ATTORNEY'S FEES
AFTER THE 1996 REGULAR SESSION
Chapter 96-159, Florida Laws, makes several significant changes
in the available ways to procure attorney's fees and court costs. Most
significantly, the new law makes attorney's fees and costs available
in rule challenge proceedings. 4 The legislation retains all previously
enacted chapter 120 attorney's fees provisions that were aimed at
deterring litigation initiated for improper purposes.44 The law con-
tributes to overall APA simplification by combining in section
120.595, Florida Statutes, the once-scattered attorney's fees provi-
sions. Additionally, the Legislature kept attorney's fees provisions in
the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act (FEAJA),45 allowing small
businesses to retain an additional avenue for recouping APA litiga-
tion costs.
A. Overview of General Attorney's Fees Provisions in the New APA
The most significant change in the APA attorney's fees scheme is
the addition of attorney's fees provisions for rule challenge proceed-
ings.4 The revised APA makes attorney's fees and costs available to
challengers of both proposed and existing rules. 47 Rule challengers
37. See REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, at 3.
38. Dem., Live Oak.
39. Dem., Winter Haven.
40. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1996 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 174, SB 2290.
41. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, 1996 Fla. Laws 147.
42. See generally id.
43. See FLA. STAT. § 120.595(2)-(3) (Supp. 1996).
44. See id. § 120.595(1), (4), (5).
45. See id. § 57.111 (1995).
46. This Comment refers to these new attorney's fees provisions as the "rule chal-
lenge attorney's fees provisions." This should be distinguished from "1996 attorney's fees
changes," which refer to all of the attorney's fees changes made in 1996.
47. See FLA. STAT. § 120.595(2), (3) (Supp. 1996).
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may collect attorney's fees from an agency if a rule is found to be in-
valid, unless the agency demonstrates that its actions were substan-
tially justified or other special circumstances exist that make the
award unjust.48 All awards of attorney's fees are limited to $15,000
per rule challenge proceeding.
49
The new law retains the provision in former section
120.57(1)(b)(5), Florida Statutes, that awarded attorney's fees when
an action was commenced by any party for an improper purpose. 0
The law also retains the provision in former section 120.59, Florida
Statutes, that provided factors for administrative law judges to con-
sider when determining whether an action was commenced for an
improper purpose.5" Additionally, the revised APA provides for rea-
sonable attorney's fees and costs for both appellate and administra-
tive proceedings if the agency improperly ignored or modified find-
ings of fact within a recommended order.5 2 Attorney's fees also are
awarded if a court determines that an "appeal was frivolous, merit-
less, or an abuse of the appellate process, or that the agency action
which precipitated the appeal was a gross abuse of the agency's dis-
cretion."
53
Secondarily, the bill consolidates all attorney's fees provisions in
a new location, section 120.595, Florida Statutes.54 Thus, the bill
provides for a more readable and understandable APA. 55
B. The Effect of the FEAJA on the New Mix of Available
Administrative Attorney's Fees
In 1980, the Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA), which requires the United States and its agencies to pay
48. See id. "Substantially justified" is defined as having a "reasonable basis in law
and fact at the time the actions were taken by the agency." Id.
49. See id.
50. See id- § 120.595(I)(e)(1). This section defines "improper purpose" as initiating
litigation to "harass or to cause unnecessary delay or for frivolous purpose or to needlessly
increase the cost of licensing or securing the approval of an activity." Id.
51. See id. § 120.595(1)(c). The administrative law judge is to consider whether the
nonprevailing party has participated in two or more other such proceedings arising from
the same transaction with the same adverse party. See id. The administrative law judge
must further decide whether the nonprevailing party established either the factual or le-
gal merits of its position earlier and whether the position taken at the present proceeding
was cognizable in one of the previous proceedings. See id.
52. See id. § 120.595(5).
53. Id.
54. Other attorney's fees provisions potentially applicable to agencies are codified in
places other than section 120.595. However, these provisions are tailored to specific
situations, limiting their availability to the average litigant. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 448.08
(1995) (awarding attorney's fees and costs to prevailing party in a suit for unpaid wages).
55. The consolidation of attorney's fees provisions exemplifies fulfillment of the Re-
view Commission's goal to create a more readable APA without making substantive
changes. See REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, at 6.
1997]
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private parties' attorney's fees and litigation costs in certain circum-
stances.5 6 Twenty-nine states quickly followed suit, enacting state
EAJAs in the following decade.57 Florida passed the Florida Equal
Access to Justice Act (FEAJA) in 1984.58 The FEAJA offers an addi-
tional avenue for parties to obtain attorney's fees and costs in admin-
istrative proceedings against state agencies. When it enacted the
FEAJA, the Legislature intended to help private parties defending
against state action. The Legislature recognized that
because of the greater resources of the state, the standard for an
award of attorney's fees and costs against the state should be dif-
ferent from the standard for an award against a private litigant.
The purpose of [the FEAJA] is to diminish the deterrent effect of
seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action by
providing in certain situations an award of attorney's fees and
costs against the state.
59
Although not a part of the APA, the FEAJA has broad effects upon
administrative litigation and provides an alternative route for some
parties to obtain litigation costs and attorney's fees. Thus, the
FEAJA is an important component of Florida's available attorney's
fees statutes.
Like the EAJA, the FEAJA contains a provision that establishes
an award of attorney's fees and costs to small business parties that
prevail "in any adjudicatory proceeding or administrative proceeding
pursuant to chapter 120 initiated by a state agency." 0 The private
litigant has the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of evi-
dence that he or she qualifies as a small business party61 and pre-
vailed in the previous proceeding. 62 If this burden is satisfied, then
the agency must prove that there were special circumstances war-
56. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, §§ 201-208, 94 Stat.
2321, 2325-30 (1980) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994)).
57. See Olson, supra note 7, at 552.
58. See Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, ch. 84-78, 1984 Fla. Laws 200 (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. § 57.111 (1995)). The Florida Legislature modeled the FEAJA after
the EAJA. See Department of Prof 1 Reg. v. Toledo Realty, Inc., 549 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla.
1st DCA 1989).
59. FLA. STAT. § 57.111(2) (1995).
60. Id. § 57.111(4) (1995). For an additional discussion of the FEAJA, see Steven
Wisotsky, Practice and Procedure Under the FEAJA, FLA. B.J., Apr. 1996, at 24.
61. See FLA. STAT. § 57.111(3)(d) (1995). The statute defines a "small business party"
as a- sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice,
whose principle place of business is in Florida. See id. § 57.111(3)(d)(1)(a). The definition
also includes a partnership or corporation whose principle place of business is in Florida.
See id. § 57.111(3)(d)(1)(b). In both cases, the entity must not have had more than 25 full-
time employees or a net worth exceeding $2 million. See id. § 57.111(3)(d)(1)(a)-(b).
62. See id. § 57.111(3)(c). A party is the "prevailing small business party" when (1) a
final judgment has been entered in favor of the party; (2) a settlement has been obtained
by the party on the majority of the suit's issues; or (3) the state agency has sought volun-
tary dismissal of its complaint. See id.
[Vol. 24:439
APA ATTORNEY'S FEES
ranting agency action or that the action was substantially justified.6 3
To take advantage of the FEAJA, an attorney must file an applica-
tion on behalf of his or her client within sixty days after prevailing in
the proceeding.6 4 The agency must respond to the application within
twenty days, stating why the attorney's fees and costs sought by the
prevailing party are unreasonable or explaining why the agency's
actions were substantially justified.65 The FEAJA limits the award of
both litigation fees and costs to $15,000 per action.66
C. Comparison of the FEAJA and Rule Challenge Attorney's Fees
Provisions
The 1996 Legislature left the FEAJA virtually unchanged.67 Un-
der the FEAJA, prevailing small businesses have an avenue for the
award of attorney's fees and court costs in proceedings initiated by
the state. In contrast, the revised APA makes attorney's fees avail-
able in a rule challenge proceeding to any nonagency party if an
administrative law judge declares an existing or proposed rule inva-
lid.6 8 Thus, the rule challenge attorney's fees provisions have a
broader scope of eligibility than the FEAJA.
The FEAJA and the rule challenge provisions also have different
fee caps. The FEAJA limits both attorney's fees and litigation costs
to $15,000 per action.69 This limitation has been criticized as inade-
quate to compensate a litigant for court costs and attorney's fees.1°
The limitation also allows agencies a "free appeal" where the busi-
ness party has reached the $15,000 ceiling for costs and attorney's
fees. 71 The rule challenge provisions have a $15,000 cap on attorney's
fees exclusive of litigation costs. 72 Thus, the rule challenge provisions
have a much higher total attorney's fees award potential than the
FEAJA.
63. See id. § 57.111(4)(a).
64. See id. § 57.111(4)(b)(2). The application must assert that the party met the req-
uisite burdens of being a small business party and prevailed in the proceeding. See FLA.
ADMIN. CODE R. 60Q-2.035(3)(1995). The application also must include "the nature [and]
extent" of the attorney's legal services and include other litigation costs involved in the
action. Id.
65. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 60Q-2.035(5)(a)(1), (3) (1995).
66. See FLA. STAT. § 57.111 (4)(d)(2) (1995).
67. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-410, § 6, 1996 Fla. Laws 2941, 2943-44
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 57.111(4)(b)(d)). The Legislature made only superficial changes to
the FEAJA, changing the term "hearing officer" to the term "administrative law judge."
See id.
68. See FLA. STAT. § 120.595(2), (3) (Supp. 1996).
69. See id. § 57.111(4)(d)(2) (1995).
70. See Wisotsky, supra note 60, at 32.
71. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Redi-Care Home Serv., Inc., 650 So. 2d
222, 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (denying fees on appeal because agency had previously paid
out the maximum amount under the $15,000 cap).
72. See FLA. STAT. § 120.595(2), (3) (Supp. 1996).
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IV. OVERVIEW OF FEE-SHIFTING MECHANISMS AND THEIR
EMERGENCE IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
Federal courts have traditionally adhered to the "American Rule,"
which dictates that parties pay their own attorney's fees and litiga-
tion costs, regardless of who wins the litigation.73 However, lawmak-
ers have begun to create exceptions to the general rule. Recognizing
the powerful potential effects of reallocating attorney's fees, law-
makers have used fee-shifting provisions to effectuate specific goals
in special litigation situations.7 4 For example, the 1996 attorney's
fees changes were created to carry out the goals outlined by Gover-
nor Chiles and the Review Commission.
75
Two major types of exceptions to the American Rule exist: two-
way fee-shifting mechanisms and one-way fee-shifting mechanisms. 7
Two-way fee-shifting mechanisms, used by the British, require the
loser to pay the prevailing party's litigation costs and thus treat
most defendants and plaintiffs equally.77 More common in the United
States is the one-way fee-shifting mechanism. The one-way fee shift,
which is generally pro-plaintiff, allows a prevailing plaintiff to collect
attorney's fees from the defendant, but does not allow a prevailing
defendant to collect from the plaintiff.78 Variations of these basic
types of fee-shifting mechanisms also exist. For example, a two-way
shift may require defendants to meet a higher standard of proof to
recover than is required of plaintiffs.7 9
The choice of a fee-shifting mechanism depends largely upon the
intended effects of the fee shift because one-way and two-way
mechanisms have quite different impacts upon litigation.80 Legisla-
tors may consider a two-way fee shift to provide indemnification to
the winner of litigation.8 ' Legislators may invoke a one-way shift to
create a stronger manipulative effect upon an area of litigation, per-
haps using the fee shift as an economic incentive.8 2 In addition, legis-
lators should contemplate the impact of the fee-shifting mechanism
73. See Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61
N.C. L. REV. 613, 613 (1983). Courts have followed the American Rule since the U.S. Su-
preme Court held in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796), that attorney's fees
are not recoverable by a prevailing party as damages and that each party must bear the
burden of its own attorney's fees. See id. at 306; see also Mallor, supra, at 653 n.1.
74. See Mallor, supra note 73, at 613-614.
75. See discussion supra Part II.B.






82. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653.
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upon procedural practices and judicial staffing for the specific area of
substantive law affected by the fee shift.8 3
V. A COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE 1996 ATTORNEY'S FEES
CHANGES
The rule challenge attorney's fees provisions are one-way fee-
shifting mechanism because they award attorney's fees only to pre-
vailing challengers of agency rules and not to prevailing agencies.
8 4
The FEAJA also is a one-way fee-shifting mechanism because it
applies exclusively to small businesses and cannot be utilized by the
opposing agency.8 5 To predict the costs and benefits of the rule chal-
lenge attorney's fees provisions, this Comment will analyze the ef-
fects common to one-way fee-shifting mechanisms, primarily the
FEAJA, which was enacted for many of the same reasons as the rule
challenge provisions."'
A. Potential Benefits of the 1996 Attorney's Fees Changes
Governor Chiles, the Review Commission, and the 1996 Legisla-
ture contemplated specific goals when they called for APA reform.
These goals included less red tape, a more simplified APA, greater
citizen participation, increased agency monitoring, and equalization
of resources between public and private parties. 7 The Review
Commission and the 1996 Legislature crafted the attorney's fees
changes with these goals in mind. Thus, this analysis begins by con-
sidering whether the 1996 changes will accomplish these goals.
1. Cutting Red Tape
Awarding attorney's fees for successful rule challenges is likely to
have an anti-rulemaking effect because it creates an incentive to
challenge agency rules." Individuals gain an incentive to litigate
when they can obtain enough relief to compensate them for their ef-
forts and their risk.8 9 The rule challenge attorney's fees provisions
83. See id. at 655.
84. See FLA. STAT. § 120.595(2), (3) (Supp. 1996).
85. See id. § 57.111 (1995).
86. The FEAJA was enacted because "certain persons may be deterred from seeking
review of, or defending against, unreasonable governmental action because of the expense
of civil actions and administrative proceedings." Id. § 57.111(2). Similarly, the rule chal-
lenge attorney's fees provisions were enacted, in part, to create a "more level playing field"
for persons who challenge agency rules. See REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25,
at 2.
87. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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will encourage parties to challenge agency rules because additional
attorney's fees and costs will enhance damage awards, making liti-
gation more attractive.90 Because parties can now obtain reimburse-
ment for their litigation costs, the rule challenge attorney's fees pro-
visions will induce suits where minimal, if any, monetary damages
were previously recoverable. 1 Additionally, agencies may be more
cautious in their rulemaking efforts, which will result in fewer
agency rule proposals and, consequently, fewer agency rules.92 The
rule challenge attorney's fees provisions will thus be effective in con-
tributing to cutting red tape, thereby satisfying at least one of the
goals envisioned by the Governor.
2. Simplifying the APA
The 1996 attorney's fees changes relocated virtually all general
attorney's fees provisions to one section in the APA.9 3 Combining at-
torney's fees provisions and placing them in section 120.595, Florida
Statutes, makes the APA more logical and organized and thus easier
to understand. 4 However, the 1996 Legislature could have made the
simplification process more complete by also including the FEAJA in
section 120.595. Unlike all of the other general attorney's fees provi-
sions that affect administrative proceedings, the FEAJA is not con-
tained in section 120.595, but rather in section 57.111, Florida Stat-
utes. An absolute simplification of attorney's fees provisions in the
APA must include the FEAJA in section 120.595 because the FEAJA
concerns attorney's fees and pertains exclusively to the APA.
95
3. Monitoring Agency Action
One-way fee-shifting provisions are frequently enacted for moni-
toring purposes. 6 The rule challenge attorney's fees provisions offer
90. See id.
91. Previously, parties would not have had enough incentive to litigate when the re-
covery award would not even cover their attorney's fees. Now, parties with few resources
will be much more likely to sue when they foresee a good opportunity to litigate success-
fully, especially where a contingency fee arrangement had not previously been an option.
Therefore, more lawyers will be willing to accept cases challenging agency rules and more
litigants will be seeking counsel. See id.
92. See discussion infra Part V.B.4.
93. See FLA. STAT. § 120.595 (Supp. 1996); see also discussion supra Part III.A.
94. But see Maher, supra note 1, at 342 (contending that the new version of the APA
will create confusion and unnecessary costs because people will not be able to find the
"familiar things").
95. See FLA. STAT. § 57.111 (1995).
96. See Krent, supra note 88, at 2046. Congress has relied upon judges and affected
parties to aid in federal agency monitoring. For example, Congress created private rights
of action under the Federal Labor Relations Authority, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994),
and the Merit Systems Protection Board, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7703 (1994). Similarly, one-
[Vol. 24:439
APA ATTORNEY'S FEES
two ways to increase monitoring of state agencies. First, the in-
creased litigation sparked by the availability of additional attorney's
fees might bring more potentially wrongful agency actions to the at-
tention of oversight committees. 7 By encouraging litigation,98 the
rule challenge attorney's fees provisions will provide a consistent
flow of information about the pitfalls of agency rulemaking.99 Legis-
lators and agency officials can take note of the most frequently liti-
gated provisions that courts struggle to interpret or apply. With this
knowledge, they can better judge which agency enabling statutes re-
quire reform. Thus, the rule challenge attorney's fees provisions will
potentially further agency oversight by highlighting those statutes
that demand reform.100
Second, the increased litigation resulting from the rule challenge
attorney's fees provisions will give judges the opportunity to examine
the validity of a greater number of agency rules. Heightened judicial
review of agency rules will ensure that agencies act consistently with
their delegated authority.' 10 Aware of this enhanced oversight,
agencies will be less likely to exceed their delegated authority when
formulating rules and will be encouraged to create rules that are
practical and intelligible." 2 Accordingly, the rule challenge attor-
ney's fees provisions likely will satisfy the Review Commission's goal
of increased agency monitoring, thereby benefiting the entire admin-
istrative process.
4. Creating a More Level Playing Field
The 1996 Legislature strove to create a more level playing field
for the public by adding the rule challenge attorney's fees provisions.
Similarly, one-way fee-shifting mechanisms, such as the FEAJA and
the EAJA, have often been enacted to eliminate the imbalance of re-
sources between the private sector and state agencies.' 0 ' One-way
fee-shifting statutes, however, have had unpredictable redistributive
way fee shifting mechanisms employ the help of judges and private parties to police
agency actions. See Krent, supra note 88, at 2047-48.
97. See Krent, supra note 88, at 2047.
98. The 1996 attorney's fees changes encourage more litigation in rule challenge pro-
ceedings by providing a higher fee award. For a more complete discussion of the litigation
incentive of attorney's fees, see infra Part V.B.2.
99. See Krent, supra note 88, at 2047.
100. See id.
101. See REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, app. 0, at 1 (stating that in-
creased monitoring will occur if attorney's fees and costs are levied against state agen-
cies); see also Krent, supra note 88, at 2047.
102. See Krent, supra note 88, at 2048.
103. See discussion supra Part II.B; see also Olson, supra note 7, at 548; Rowe, supra
note 82, at 664. For example, Congress created a one-way fee shifting mechanism for
damages under wage statutes that involve employees suing their financially advantaged
employers. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1994).
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effects. 0 4 The specific features of a fee-shifting statute greatly influ-
ence its effectiveness in redistributing resources.
10 5
The design of the rule challenge attorney's fees provisions is rela-
tively simple: a determination that an existing or proposed agency
rule is invalid results in a judgment or order for attorney's fees and
costs unless the agency can prove its actions were substantially jus-
tified. 0 6 Though simple, the rule challenge attorney's fees provisions
likely will have a powerful redistributive effect because the success-
ful challengers of agency rules automatically receive attorney's fees
and costs without having to jump through additional hoops.
0 7
The agency has the burden of proving that its actions were sub-
stantially justified.' The substantial justification standard of recov-
ery has helped prevent private parties from successfully recovering
under one-way fee-shifting statutes, thereby limiting the redistribu-
tive effects of the statute. 0 9 Because the rule challenge attorney's
fees provisions place this burden on agencies, the effects that the
substantial justification standard will have on the success rate of
private parties under section 120.595 will be minimized."' Addi-
tional dilution of the standard's effects will occur because Florida
courts have been generous in awarding attorney's fees under the
FEAJA,"' which also contains a substantial justification standard."1
Accordingly, the inclusion of a substantial justification standard in
section 120.595 will have a minimal impact upon the redistributive
effects of the statute. Secondarily, the $15,000 cap on attorney's fees
also may limit the redistributive effects of the rule challenge attor-
ney's fees provisions, but to a much lesser extent than the substan-
tial justification standard."3
104. See Olson, supra note 7, at 577.
105. See id.
106. See FLA. STAT. § 120.595(2), (3) (Supp. 1996).
107. Under the rule challenge attorney's fees provisions, a judgment for costs and at-
torney's fees is rendered against the nonprevailing party after a rule or proposed rule is
declared invalid. See id. Under the FEAJA, a prevailing small business party must file an
application within 60 days of the final judgment to receive an award of attorney's fees. See
id. § 57.111(4)(b)(2) (1995).
108. See id. § 120.595(2), (3) (Supp. 1996)).
109. See Olson, supra note 7, at 578. The substantial justification standard represents
a compromise between the anti-government and anti-litigation movements. See id. at 578-
79. For further discussion of these competing ideologies, see discussion infra Part V.B.2.
110. See Olson, supra note 7, at 563 ("Mhe difficulty of meeting this standard is re-
duced somewhat by putting the burden of proof on the government to show that its con-
duct was substantially justified .... ).
111. See id. at 575. Floridians litigating under the FEAJA are successfully awarded
attorney's fees and costs more than 50% of the time. See id. This percentage implies that
Florida courts have chosen to make it fairly difficult for agencies to prove that their acts
were substantially justified. See id.
112. See FLA. STAT. § 57.111(4)(a) (1995).
113. See Olson, supra note 7, at 562. The $15,000 cap only limits the redistributive ef-
fects of litigation that rule challengers perceive to cost considerably more than $15,000. In
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Regardless of the $15,000 cap and the substantial justification
standard, the rule challenge attorney's fees provisions will help level
the playing field between the public and state agencies. Now, private
parties can challenge dysfunctional agency rules when previously
such a challenge would not have been financially advantageous."
4
5. Citizen Participation
One of the original purposes of the APA was to give citizens a
voice in the rulemaking process."' Additionally, public participation
in rulemaking contributes to the legitimacy of agency rules and en-
hances their authority.'
16
The rule challenge attorney's fees provisions will increase citizen
participation in agency rulemaking by providing private parties with
a monetary incentive to challenge proposed agency rules. Thus, the
number of citizens involved in the rulemaking process will increase,
which will improve the quality of agency proposals and enhance the
rule development process.' 7
B. Potential Costs of the 1996 Attorney's Fees Changes
Generally, the 1996 attorney's fees changes will accomplish the
goals they were created to achieve. However, the benefits associated
with the changes should be weighed against their potential costs.
These potential costs include greater financial burdens, overcrowded
court dockets, overdeterrence of agency action, and increased litiga-
tion costs.
1. Financial Costs
The rule challenge attorney's fees provisions will have a negative
impact upon agency budgets because of awards of attorney's fees and
litigation costs. Consequently, agencies might be forced to pass the
increased costs on to the public by raising agency and license fees."l8
those situations, plaintiffs may choose not to challenge the rule when they risk a large
sum of their own money in attorney's fees and costs. See id.
114. See Mallor, supra note 73, at 613.
115. See Johnny C. Burris, The Failure of the Florida Judicial Review Process to Pro-
vide Effective Incentives for Agency Rulemaking, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 661, 690 (1990)
("One of the purposes of the APA was to open up the relatively hidden and inaccessible
decision processes of administrative agencies to more public participation.").
116. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE
LAW AND MAKE POLICY 162 (1994). Agencies depend upon the public to supply a constant
flow of information about potential rules. See id. Such information allows the agency to
consider the acceptance of and resistance to specific rule development efforts. See id. The
members of the public will be more accepting of a rule that they had a role in creating. See id.
117. See id.
118. See Fla. S. Comm. on Gov't Reform & Oversight, CS for SBs 2290 & 2288 (1996)
Staff Analysis 29 (final Mar. 21, 1996) (on file with comm.).
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Thus, the public will eventually shoulder the costs inherent in giving
the less well-off the means to challenge agency rules."19 Other state
legislatures considering whether to implement attorney's fees provi-
sions also must consider whether the financial costs borne by the
public will be offset by the resulting benefits.
The $15,000 cap on rule challenge attorney's fees will help limit
the costs that agencies pay to litigants. However, unlike the FEAJA,
litigation costs are not included in the cap, allowing agencies' costs to
increase exponentially. 20 The cap on attorney's fees provoked vary-
ing opinions from members of the Review Commission. While Com-
missioner Wade Hopping felt that the $15,000 figure was too low,
Commissioner Linda Shelley noted that the Legislature does not ap-
propriate money for agencies to spend on attorney's fees and that
$15,000 in such circumstances amounts to a lot of money.' 2 ' A review
of other states' one-way fee-shifting statutes reveals that most im-
pose a per-hour cap, generally $75 per hour for attorney services. 2
The FEAJA's $15,000 cap is one of the highest of any state that uses
a total amount cap.'23 Thus, the $15,000 fee cap on rule challenge at-
torney's fees allows a potentially large fee award to be assessed
against state agencies, imposing a sizable financial burden that will
eventually be passed on to the regulated public.
Critics claim that the old APA did not have sufficient organiza-
tional problems to warrant simplification. 2 4 They maintain that
there have been no organizational problems cited by courts or com-
mentators in recent history."' Instead, the APA's cosmetic changes
may force the state to incur substantial costs stemming from lost
productivity because state workers will need to be retrained. 2 ' Thus,
the potential uncertainty and confusion that may result in part from
reorganization of attorney's fees provisions also carries financial
costs."
7
2. Overcrowded Court Dockets
Legislation often reflects both an anti-government ideology sup-
porting deregulation of the marketplace and a feeling that society is
119. See id.
120. See FLA. STAT. § 120.595(2), (3) (Supp. 1996).
121. See REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, app. D, at 3 (minutes of Jan. 11,
1996 meeting).
122. See Olson, supra note 7, at 562.
123. See id. at 562 n.85. Most other states using a total cap amount have limits of
$7,500 (10 states) or $10,000 (six states). Only Florida and Minnesota have higher total
fee caps. See id.
124. See Maher, supra note 1, at 342.
125. See id. at 343.
126. See id. at 342.
127. See id. at 344-45.
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burdened by too much litigation. 128 Many Americans harbor both at-
titudes as well, but the two can easily conflict. The rule challenge at-
torney's fees provisions respond to Governor Chiles' deregulation sen-
timents by employing the courts to weed out dysfunctional agency
rules. However, using the courts to streamline agency regulation will
increase litigation and place higher demands upon the judicial system.
Although litigation has increased across the country in recent
years, 12 9 courts remain prisoners to the time constraints of judges.
The influx of cases challenging agency rules will further crowd the
already burgeoning dockets of Florida courts and slow the overall
pace of litigation in the state.
1 30
3. Higher Litigation Costs
One-way fee-shifting statutes increase the number of issues that
parties must litigate and therefore increase attorney's fees and court
costs. '3 The simplicity of the 1996 attorney's fees changes will miti-
gate this effect, but increased litigation costs are inevitable. The rule
challenge attorney's fees provisions will automatically increase the
litigation expenses of an agency when a rule is challenged in court.
The agency must expend its legal resources to prove that its rule-
making was substantially justified. 32 However, even though the sub-
stantial justification standard adds to agency litigation costs, the
standard presumably deters future parties from seeking attorney's
fees where the parties concede that the agency action was justified.
Accordingly, the substantial justification standard also may save
agencies money by deterring fee claims. 3 3 However, the substantial
justification standard will impose higher costs upon Florida courts
because of the time spent hearing attorney's fees issues. 3
4
128. See Olson, supra note 7, at 545-46, 549.
129. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1093, 1093 (1987).
130. Cf. Maher, supra note 1, at 346 (predicting that simplification of the APA will re-
duce the number of lawyers willing to sift through the reorganized and unfamiliar APA).
131. See Krent, supra note 88, at 2082-83; see generally, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424 (1983) (devoting the majority of the opinion to discussing attorney's fees issues).
132. See Krent, supra note 88, at 2083; Risa L. Lieberwitz, Attorney's Fees, The NLRB,
and the Equal Access to Justice Act: From Bad to Worse, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 40 (1984).
Professor Krent emphasizes that complex attorney's fees litigation is largely due to the
substantial justification standard. See Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act-A Qualified Success, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 458, 479 (1993).
133. See Krent, supra note 132, at 479-82. The litigation costs to agencies of proving
substantial justification issues probably exceeds the amount saved in attorney's fees in
minor litigation because the standard requires parties to relitigate their underlying dis-
pute. See id. Large amounts of agency resources are required for attorney's fees litigation.
See id. Nevertheless, the gate-keeping function served by the substantial justification
standard saves valuable agency resources by deterring attorney's fees claims. See id.
134. See Krent, supra note 88, at 2082-83.
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Furthermore, one-way fee-shifting statutes increase litigation
costs by decreasing settlement incentives. Logically, the more issues
that parties must dispute, the lesser the probability of agreement.'35
Liability for attorney's fees and litigation costs give parties new is-
sues to resolve, thus decreasing the chances for settlement. Although
simple in design, the rule challenge attorney's fees provisions will
still make settlement less likely, thereby increasing litigation ex-
penses. 3 1 These increased expenses will eventually flow to the pub-
lic, the ultimate financier of the judicial systemi.and agency opera-
tions.
37
4. Overdeterrence of Agency Regulation-Cutting Too Much Red
Tape?
Although the 1996 attorney's fees changes were created in part to
reduce red tape by deterring promulgation of invalid agency rules,1
38
overdeterrence is a potential risk.1 9 While to some extent the sub-
stantial justification standard guards against overdeterrence, it is
still a viable risk because of the overall design of the rule challenge
attorney's fees provisions.
a. Problems with Attorney's Fees for Proposed Rules
Section 120.595, Florida Statutes, allows a judgment to be ren-
dered against an agency for attorney's fees if a proposed or existing
rule is declared invalid. 40 A proposed rule is an agency's first official
step in rulemaking, signaling the beginning of the rule development
process.'4 ' After an agency publishes a notice of rule development,
the APA provides many opportunities for public input on the pro-
posal through hearings and workshops.14' Each invitation for public
commentary contributes to the lengthy and arduous rule develop-
ment process.
4 3
135. See id. at 2079-80.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 2083.
138. See discussion supra Part II.B.
139. See Krent, supra note 88, at 2075.
140. See FLA. STAT. § 120.595(2), (3) (Supp. 1996).
141- See id. § 120.54(2)(a). When an agency proposes a rule, it must publish a notice of
rule development in the Florida Administrative Weekly. See id.
142. See id. § 120.54(2)(c). The agency must hold a public workshop if requested in
writing by any affected person, unless the agency head explains in writing why a work-
shop is unnecessary. See id. Before adopting the rule, the agency must publish its intent.
See id. § 120.54(3)(a)(1). After deciding to adopt the rule, an agency must provide even
more opportunities for challenging the rule, such as scheduling a public hearing upon the
request of any affected person. See id. § 120.54(3)(c)(1). An agency can also voluntarily
hold a public hearing. See id.
143. The rulemaking process can be lengthy because of the potential for numerous
public hearings. In addition, an agency cannot modify anything other than technical de-
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Because of the tentative nature of proposed rules, the imposition
of attorney's fees when proposed rules are invalidated could have a
drastic impact upon agency rulemaking.'44 Agencies will likely re-
duce the number of rules they propose for fear of the high litigation
costs that accompany successful rule challenges. Agencies will find
themselves in a defensive stance, always making sure that they have
undeniable and substantial justifications for placing their proposals
into the rule development process. 45 Putting agencies in such a pre-
carious position will hinder the rule development process by making
agencies hesitant to put proposals on the public negotiating table.
b. The Necessity of Utilizing Attorney's Fees to Deter Agency
Rulemaking
A primary reason for assessing attorney's fees when proposed
rules are found invalid stems from Governor Chiles' call to cut red
tape. However, the APA already facilitates this goal by giving af-
fected parties input in the rulemaking process. 41 Critical commen-
tary by affected parties should winnow out useless proposed rules
and tailor those that remain in such a way as to achieve maximum
effectiveness, thereby allowing only necessary proposals to survive
the rule development process and become permanent rules. 147 Thus,
the rule development process already streamlines proposals, which
supports Governor Chiles' goal. Adding awards of attorney's fees to
further deter agency rulemaking is unnecessary.
Governor Chiles has never supported his claim that rulemaking is
overly burdensome and expensive for state agencies. However, in
1995, in response to Chiles' anti-regulation sentiment, Florida
agencies for the first time in history repealed more rules than they
adopted.4' The need for attorney's fees provisions to further deter
fects in the proposed rule unless the modifications are supported by the public hearing re-
cord or are in response to either a written comment received before the public hearing or a
proposed objection by the Legislature's Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. See
id. § 120.54(3)(d)(1).
144. Cf. Krent, supra note 88, at 2078. Professor Krent finds a small risk in overde-
terring agency action where a substantial justification standard exists. Although the rule
challenge attorney's fees provisions contain a substantial justification standard, the un-
derlying conduct of agencies will be affected because the revised APA assesses litigation
costs at the proposal level. See id.
145. See id. Agencies will be careful to stay within a safe zone. In the initial stages of
rulemaking, this cautiousness may dangerously minimize an agency's willingness to in-
troduce proposals. See id.
146. By allowing affected parties a voice in the rule development process, the APA in-
vites the most critical parties' opinions. Such a thorough examination exposes a proposal's
most prominent flaws.
147. See Maher, supra note 1, at 345-46. The affected public is strongly represented in
the rule development process and has a voice in new agency policies. See id. at 345.
148. See id. at 328.
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rulemaking is questionable because the provisions are designed to
address a problem-runaway agency rulemaking-that may not
even exist. Additionally, people ignore the definite benefits of written
rules for both the public and agencies. Rules are not always the en-
emy. Rather, the costs of eliminating rules may be the true hidden
specter. 149
c. Risks of Phantom Government
The "ossification" of rulemaking carries the risk of reverting to
the phantom regulation prevalent in pre-APA days. 150 Former Sena-
tor Dempsey Barron' used the term "phantom government" to de-
scribe the time before the APA when "rules were kept in bureau-
crats' desk drawers and only agency insiders knew them" and the
public discovered them the hard way, by breaking them."2 Elimina-
tion of agency rules will not quell regulation because agencies would
revert to making rules in the form of unwritten agency policies.'53
149. See id. at 322. Written rules add certainty to any society. See id. at 335. With the
onset of the computer age, public access to rules will increase, augmenting the benefits of
written rules. See id. at 323. Additionally, rules protect the public from government by
communicating agency policy and allowing opponents to challenge those policies. See id.
at 331. For a further discussion of the benefits of rulemaking as opposed to policy by adjudi-
cation, see Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal
Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 763, 769-73.
150. Rulemaking ossification, a byproduct of judicial review, can substantively "affect
the pace and quantity of agency regulation." See Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress Into
An Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731,
741 (1996).
151. Dem., Panama City, 1957-1988.
152. See Maher, supra note 1, at 329.
153. See Burris, supra note 115, at 668. If the Legislature builds barriers that inhibit
agency rulemaking, then agencies will seek other alternatives for developing public poli-
cies. See id. But see FLA. STAT. § 120.535 (1995) (repealed and recodified 1996). This stat-
ute required agencies to adopt necessary rules through the rulemaking process and pro-
vided citizens with a cause of action against an agency for failing to do so. See id. The
statute also awarded attorney's fees to persons who successfully demonstrated that an
agency is not permitted to rely on the statement for agency action. See id. Although the
Legislature repealed this statute, its provisions were divided among sections 120.54(1)(a),
120.56(4), 120.595(4), 120.80(13)(a), and 120.81(3)(a) in the simplification process. See Act
effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, § 10, 1996 Fla. Laws 147, 160-61; id. § 16, 1996 Fla.
Laws at 182-83; id. § 25, 1996 Fla. Laws at 196; id. § 41, 1996 Fla. Laws at 208-09; id. §
42, 1996 Fla. Laws at 211.
In addition, section 120.57(l)(e), Florida Statutes, prevents agencies from relying upon
unadopted rules by imposing attorney's fees when an agency "determines the substantial
interest of a party" based upon an unadopted rule that is set aside. FLA. STAT. §
120.57(1)(e) (Supp. 1996). Thus, given this section, which deters policy-oriented adjudica-
tory decisions, and the ossifying effects of the rule challenge attorney's fees provisions,
overall agency inaction will be the likely result.
These provisions help prevent unwritten rulemaking efforts by requiring agencies to
promulgate rules through the rulemaking process. However, these provisions alone can-
not prevent all phantom government. Agencies can still find ways to avoid putting rules
through the rule development process. Thus, the rule challenge attorney's fees provisions
will still encourage phantom government rulemaking.
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Such policies will not have the public input of policies that result
from the APA rule development process and will be difficult for citi-
zens to challenge.
5 4
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE APA: MAXIMIZING
BENEFITS, REDUCING COSTS
The 1996 attorney's fees changes assure some true benefits, yet
definite costs are present. Although some costs are inevitable, fur-
ther modification of attorney's fees provisions could more effectively
minimize costs and maximize benefits. Most important, eliminating
certain elements from the rule challenge attorney's fees provisions
would reduce financial costs dramatically, while not significantly af-
fecting the positive goals of those provisions.
Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes, which awards attorney's fees
to challengers of defective proposed rules, greatly increases the po-
tential for agencies to incur significant costs. Eliminating this pro-
vision would avert overdeterrence of agency rulemaking, thereby al-
laying concerns that Florida will revert back to the "phantom gov-
ernment" era. The overall financial costs of the 1996 attorney's fees
changes also would decrease with the elimination of section
120.595(2). Additionally, eliminating this section would remove one
of the litigation incentives, which would in turn reduce overcrowded
court dockets. 15
Another cost-reduction measure involves changing the cap on at-
torney's fees, which is currently set at $15,000 per action, excluding
costs. '5 Because a blanket cap fails to affect the rates that attorneys
bill per hour, it exerts less control over litigation bills. The rule
challenge attorney's fees provisions should instead contain a reason-
ableness requirement fashioned to guard against excessive billing
charges. A bright-line, per-hour fee standard would more effectively
control attorneys' litigation charges. Furthermore, a bright-line
standard would avoid the complex issues raised when calculating
"reasonable" attorney's fees 1 7 and increase certainty for rule chal-
lengers seeking attorney's fees.15 8
154. See Maher, supra note 1, at 331 (claiming that written rules have become the
"fall guy" for people's unhappiness with government policies).
155. By abolishing just one of the new ways to obtain attorney's fees under the APA,
financial costs would be reduced to a more manageable level. Parties would still be able to
obtain attorney's fees for successful challenges to existing rules and for frivolous appeals.
See FLA. STAT. § 120.595(3), (5) (Supp. 1996).
156. See id. § 120.595(2), (3).
157. See Olson, supra note 7, at 562.
158. Before deciding to challenge a rule, parties evaluate their chances of winning and
their potential monetary awards. Parties also determine their potential risks, namely how
much they might lose. A bright-line hourly attorney's fees cap would help rule challengers
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Many states use a cap of $75 per hour in their EAJAs."19 A $100-
per-hour fee with statutorily provided cost-of-living increases would
provide a better incentive for persons to challenge rules. Although a
$100-per-hour cap probably would not cover all of the prevailing
party's attorney's fees, agencies would still pay a substantial portion,
thereby helping to equalize the playing field for private parties while
minimizing agency expenses.
The substantial justification standard should be retained in the
rule challenge attorney's fees provisions because the standard pro-
vides a valuable safe harbor for agencies and deters unnecessary at-
torney's fees litigation. The steep costs related to the substantial
justification standard could be reduced by describing the standard
more explicitly in section 120.595. Currently, section 120.595 pro-
vides that "[a]n agency's actions are 'substantially justified' if there
was a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time the actions were
taken by the agency."' 0 This definition of the standard mimics the
federal EAJA's definition of "substantially justified,"'161 and the fed-
eral EAJA has undoubtedly contributed to an increase in litiga-
tion. 62 Thus, duplication of the federal EAJA will produce the same
litigious result, costing Florida agencies and the public valuable re-
sources. A major source of litigation will be determining what is a
"reasonable basis in law and fact," a determination the courts will
make at the public's expense. 16 Additionally, courts have considerable
leeway when determining what is reasonable, which may lead to un-
desirable inconsistencies among Florida's district courts of appeal.
164
To mitigate substantial justification litigation, the Legislature
should add a more precise definition of "substantial justification" to
section 120.52, the APA's definition section. A better description of
the substantial justification standard would furnish courts, litigants,
and agencies with the additional guidance needed to lessen the
amount of litigation, thereby cutting financial costs for all.
weigh their risk potential. Parties can mare easily estimate the attorney's fees that an
agency would be required to pay if a rule were overturned. See generally JOHN E.
SHAPARD, FED. JUD. CTR., THE INFLUENCE OF RULES RESPECTING RECOVERY OF AT-
TORNEYS' FEES ON SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL CASES (1984), available in 1984 WL 62567
(describing an empirical study exploring the probability of settlement conducted at the
Federal Judicial Center).
159. See Olson, supra note 7, at 562.
160. FLA. STAT. § 120.595(2), (3) (Supp. 1996).
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(a) (1994).
162. See Krent, supra note 132, at 459, 479.
163. See Olson, supra note 7, at 563.
164. Cf. id. at 575. Arizona courts interpret their state's EAJA provision strictly and
deny awards of attorney's fees to more than half the claimants. See id. However, the Ari-
zona statute does not contain a substantial justification standard for courts to use to safe-
guard agencies and the public treasury. See id. The narrow interpretation of state EAJA




Simplifying the previously scattered attorney's fees provisions by
compiling them in one section has made the provisions more acces-
sible and is a notable improvement. All that is missing from a com-
plete simplification of the APA attorney's fees provisions is the
FEAJA, which should be moved into section 120.595. Currently, the
FEAJA is the only major attorney's fees provision solely applicable to
administrative proceedings that is not contained in section
120.595.165 The addition of the FEAJA to section 120.595 would
complete the reorganization of APA attorney's fees provisions and
would contribute to a new, more understandable APA.
Awarding attorney's fees for successful challenges to existing
rules will serve a valuable function by encouraging parties to chal-
lenge poorly drafted administrative rules that have a negative im-
pact upon the public. The rule development process affords agencies
a large window of opportunity to contemplate the effects of proposed
rules. Because existing rules have already gone through the rule de-
velopment process, agencies should take more responsibility for
them.'66 If attorney's fees were awarded only to challengers of defec-
tive existing rules and not proposed rules, agencies could freely
submit their proposals to the public while retaining the opportunity
to examine the proposals more closely during the developmental
process. Such a scheme would encourage agencies to explore creative
ideas, but would ensure that they employ only the most useful ideas
as permanent rules.
The remaining attorney's fees provisions guard against litigation
initiated for an improper purpose or frivolous litigation in adminis-
trative proceedings and appeals.'67 These fee-shifting provisions
punish unjustified or undesirable behavior and serve an important
deterrent function by discouraging misconduct in administrative
litigation."8 Thus, these sections should be maintained to deter bad
faith litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The 1996 attorney's fees changes will achieve a number of posi-
tive goals. However, many of the attendant costs have potentially
unfavorable effects. Several amendments to the new attorney's fees
scheme would mitigate these costs without reducing the overall ef-
fectiveness of section 120.595. First and most important, the Legisla-
ture should repeal section 120.595(2), which awards attorney's fees
165. See generally Seann M. Frazier, Award of Attorneys' Fees in Administrative Liti-
gation, FLA. B.J., July/Aug. 1995, at 74 (reviewing the three general ways to seek attor-
ney's fees under the APA).
166. See discussion supra Part V.B.4.a. (describing the rulemaking process).
167. See FLA. STAT. § 120.595(1), (4), (5) (Supp. 1996).
168. See Rowe, supra note 82, at 660 (describing the rationale for pvnitive fee shilling).
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to successful challengers of proposed rules. Second, the cap on attor-
ney's fees should be changed from an overall fee cap to a per-hour fee
cap. Third, the substantial justification standard should be more
precisely defined. Finally, the FEAJA should be incorporated in sec-
tion 120.595 for simplification purposes. Retaining the attorney's
fees provisions for existing rules and frivolous litigation will yield
worthy benefits and will not incur significant costs. If these propos-
als are realized, the APA attorney's fees provisions can achieve the
goals for which they were created.
Many of the costs and benefits resulting from implementation of
the 1996 attorney's fees changes apply to any effort to control agency
actions and litigation patterns through attorney's fees. Thus, other
states contemplating APA reform should weigh these costs and
benefits when formulating attorney's fees provisions for their own
APAs. After all, the best regulatory schemes result from many trials
and failures, each contributing to a more perfect administrative
scheme.
